That is, by conditioning on A the entropy of X can decrease by at most the bitlength |A| of A. Such chain rules are known to hold for some computational entropy notions like Yao's and unpredictability-entropy. For HILL entropy, the computational analogue of min-entropy, the chain rule is of special interest and has found many applications, including leakage-resilient cryptography, deterministic encryption, and memory delegation. These applications rely on restricted special cases of the chain rule. Whether the chain rule for conditional HILL entropy holds in general was an open problem for which we give a strong negative answer: we construct joint distributions (X, Z, A), where A is a distribution over a single bit, such that the HILL entropy H HILL (X|Z) is large but H HILL (X|Z, A) is basically zero. Our counterexample just makes the minimal assumption that NP P/poly. Under the stronger assumption that injective one-way function exist, we can make all the distributions efficiently samplable. Finally, we show that some more sophisticated cryptographic objects like lossy functions can be used to sample a distribution constituting a counterexample to the chain rule making only a single invocation to the underlying object.
H ∞ (X) upper bounds the probability of X taking any particular value (or equivalently, the advantage of any algorithm A in guessing X) as 
Chain rules.
One of the most useful tools for manipulating and arguing about entropies are chain rules, which come in many different flavors for different entropy notions. For Shannon entropy, we have the following simple chain rule for possibly dependent random variables X, A:
H 1 (X|A) = H 1 (X, A) − H 1 (A).
Using H 1 (X, A) ≥ H 1 (X) and H 1 (A) ≤ |A| (where |A| denotes the bitlength of A) this implies (with H = H 1 ) (1.6) H(X|A) ≥ H(X) − |A|.
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Although this is a weaker statement than (1.5), it already captures the fact that the entropy of X decreases by at most the bitlength |A| of A if we condition on A. As we will discuss below, such a chain rule not only holds for Shannon entropy, but many other information theoretic and computational entropy notions. More generally, for many notions one can give chain rules for conditional entropies by considering the case where X has some entropy conditioned on Z, and bound by how much the entropy drops when additionally given A:
H(X|Z, A) ≥ H(X|Z) − |A|. Dodis et al. (2008) define conditional min-entropy as follows:
Definition 1.8. For a pair (X, Z) of random variables, the average min-entropy of X conditioned on Z is
They show that this notion satisfies a chain rule like in (1.7):
where H 0 (A) ≤ |A| denotes the logarithm of the support-size of A. They also show that this notion naturally extends the property (1.3) of min-entropy as an upper bound on the guessing probability to the conditional case:
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When defining the computational entropy of a variable X, not only the quantity k is of interest, but also the quality, which specifies which class of distinguishers X fools and with which advantage. Below we formally define HILL entropy, as well as the more general conditional HILL entropy, but first need one more basic definition. 
We say X and Y are (ε, s)-indistinguishable, denoted by X ∼ ε,s Y , if for every Boolean circuit D of size at most s it holds that
Two ensembles of distributions X = {X n } n∈N and Y = {Y n } n∈N are indistinguishable, denoted by X ∼ c Y , if for every polynomial p = p(n) it holds that X n ∼ 1/p,p Y n for all sufficiently large n.
With X ∼ δ Y we denote that the statistical distance of X and Y is at most δ, i.e., X ∼ δ,∞ Y . X ∼ Y denotes that X and Y have the same distribution, i.e., X ∼ 0 Y . Definition 1.12 (Håstad et al. 1999) . A random variable X has HILL entropy k, denoted by H Definition 1.13 (Hsiao et al. 2007) . Let (X, Z) be a joint distribution of random variables. Then X has conditional HILL entropy k conditioned on Z, denoted by H 
Model of computation.
In this paper, we stick to a nonuniform model of computation when considering adversaries. In cc 25 (2016) particular, note that in Definition 1.11 we defined indistinguishability in terms of circuits. On the other hand, when considering efficient cryptographic objects like one-way functions, we always assume that they are computable in a uniform model, i.e., by a single Turing machine running in time polynomial in its input length. We also define "efficient samplability" in a uniform sense. Definition 1.14. An ensemble of distributions {X n } n∈N is efficiently samplable if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time
These choices are not crucial, and all the result can be adapted considering uniform adversaries and/or non-uniform cryptographic objects. We chose this particular model to get the strongest conclusion (i.e., a counterexample to the chain rule by an efficiently and uniformly samplable distribution), at the cost of a stronger, but still widely believed assumption, i.e., existence of one-way functions secure against non-uniform adversaries.
Chain rules for computational entropy.
Chain rules for conditional entropy as in (1.7) (and thus also for the special non-conditional case (1.6)) are easily seen to hold for some computational entropy notions. We give the chain rules for (conditional) Yao and unpredictability entropy in Appendix A. For HILL entropy, a chain rule has been found independently by Reingold et al. (2008) and Dziembowski & Pietrzak (2008) The quantitative bounds for ε , s in the statement of this lemma are from Jetchev & Pietrzak (2014) . The result from Vadhan & Zheng (2013) can be used to get a better s ≈ sε 2 /2 bound (and the same ε ≈ ε), and whenever s is large enough as a function of 1/ε and 2 , concretely, this bound holds if s = Ω(2 /ε 4 ).
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Note that in Lemma 1.15, conditioning on A ∈ {0, 1} not only decreases the quantity of entropy by , but also the quality goes down polynomially in ε −1 and 2 , and this is unavoidable. 4 Another important point is that the lemma is only stated for the nonconditional case, i.e., it is of the form (1.6), not the more general (1.7). Whether or not a chain rule for conditional HILL entropy holds "remains an interesting open problem" (Fuller et al. 2012) . 
Concretely, we know that a loss of max{2 , ε −1 } in either the distinguishing advantage or the circuit size is unavoidable (Trevisan et al. 2009) . 5 We will discuss some other restricted settings in which the chain rule for HILL entropy holds in Section 3. 
(iii) There exists a polynomial time Turing machine M that perfectly recognizes For the rest of this section, we fix some n (used to index the distributions {(X n , Z n , A n )} n∈N ) and will omit the subscripts n. We construct distributions as in Theorem 2.1 from any perfectly binding (bit) commitment scheme com : {0, 1} × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m as in Definition 5.1 and note that such a scheme exists iff injective one-way functions exist. Concretely, the distribution (X, Z, A) constituting a counterexample to the chain rule is sampled using com as follows:
• Sample the bit A ← {0, 1} at random.
• Compute commitments
, where the first 2n are commitments to A (i.e., B i = A for i = 1 . . . 2n) and the last n are commitments to 1 − A.
) and output the sorted list of the C i 's as Z and the sorted list of the n last S i 's as X, that is
So, X is the "opening information" for the n commitments to 1−A which are "hidden" among the 3n commitments in Z. As required by Theorem 2.1 one can efficiently distinguish X from any X = X given (Z, A). To see this, note that X is a list of n sorted tuples (C, R, 1 − A) where each such tuple satisfies C = com(1 − A, R) for some C ∈ Z. As com is perfectly binding, X is sorted and Z contains exactly n commitments to 1 − A, it follows that there is exactly one list (namely X) satisfying all these conditions, and these conditions can all be efficiently checked given (Z, A).
On the other hand, we claim that, as required Theorem 2.1, X has at least n bits of HILL entropy given only Z but not A. To prove this, we consider a random variable Y which is defined by picking a random n element subset of (S 1 , . . . , S 2n ) and outputting it in lexicographic order. This Y has min-entropy H ∞ (Y |Z) ≥ n since it is uniform over exponentially 2n n ≥ 2 n many possible subsets. Moreover (Y, Z) is computationally indistinguishable from (X, Z). We will prove this by showing how a distinguisher for these distributions can be used to break the hiding property of com. By Definition 1.13 the existence of such a (Y, Z) means that X has n bits of HILL entropy conditioned on Z as claimed.
The construction of a distribution (X, Z, A) as claimed in Theorem 2.1(b) assuming only NP ⊆ P/poly is very similar. The only difference is that instead of using a perfectly binding commitment scheme to construct a distribution (C, R, B) as above, we only assume that there exists a distribution that has some, but not all, of the properties of (C, R, B). In particular, we don't require the distribution to be efficiently samplable, and we need B to be pseudorandom given C only for infinitely many (not all sufficiently cc 25 (2016) A counterexample to the chain rule 577 large) n ∈ N. We'll call an ensemble of such distributions "committing" (cf. Definition 5.3). We show that such an ensemble exists assuming NP ⊆ P/poly in Section 5.3.
Efficient counterexample from lossy functions.
To sample a distribution that constitutes a counterexample to the chain rule using injective one-way functions as in Theorem 2.1 requires a linear (in the entropy gap n) number of invocations to the OWF.
In Section 6, we show how that using more sophisticated cryptographic objects, one can sample such distributions much more efficiently. In particular, we construct an ensemble of efficiently samplable distributions {(X n , Z n , A n )} n∈N (where A n ∈ {0, 1}) making just two invocations to an -lossy function, where for any polynomial p = p(n) and some fixed polynomial s = s(n), for all sufficiently large n it holds that
In the conference version of this paper (Krenn et al. 2013) , we also give an efficient counterexample from any deniable encryption scheme (Canetti et al. 1997) . This indicates that cryptographic objects achieving some kind of deniability or lossiness must embed an efficient counterexample to the chain rule for HILL entropy. Thus, distributions which constitute such a counterexample seem to be a useful cryptographic resource.
cc 25 (2016) notions of computational entropy include Yao entropy (Barak et al. 2003; Yao 1982) , unpredictability entropy (Hsiao et al. 2007) , and metric entropy (Barak et al. 2003) .
Chain rules for many of these entropy notions are known. Although in this work we show that the chain rule for conditional HILL entropy does not hold in general, it does hold in some interesting and useful restricted cases. We already discussed that a chain rule for non-conditional HILL entropy holds as stated in Lemma 1.15. This rule has applications in leakage-resilient cryptography (Dziembowski & Pietrzak 2008 ) and deterministic encryption (Fuller et al. 2012) . Chung et al. (2011) prove a chain rule for conditional samplable HILL entropy, a variant of conditional HILL entropy one gets when changing Definition 1.13 by additionally requiring Y to be efficiently samplable given Z. They use this rule to construct "memory delegation" schemes. Fuller et al. (2012) give a chain rule for decomposable HILL entropy, where one requires X to have high HILL entropy conditioned on any particular conditional part Z = z. Skorski (2013) introduces modular entropy, and gives a unified treatment of the chain rules for decomposable and samplable HILL entropy in terms of this new notion. Reyzin (2011, Theorem 2 and thereafter) gives a chain rule for conditional relaxed HILL entropy. Here "relaxed" does not refer to the notion of HILL entropy, but rather to the type of the chain rule: We get the notion of relaxed HILL entropy by replacing (Y, Z) in Definition 1.13 with (Y, Z ), i.e., one does not require the marginal distribution of the conditional part Z to be the same as in the original distribution (X, Z). Such a rule is already implicit in the work of Gentry & Wichs (2011) , who use it to prove a black-box separation.
Notation and basic definitions
We use the standard "big O" notation:
A counterexample to the chain rule 579 all n ≥ n 0 . All logarithms are to base 2. For as set S, we denote by |S| its cardinality. For a bitstring x, |x| denotes its length and for a circuit A, |A| denotes its size. The support of a distribution X is supp[X] = {x | Pr [X = x] > 0}. By x ← X we denote that x is assigned a value according to the distribution X. For a set X , by x ← X we denote that x is drawn uniformly at random from X . For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote with x ← A that x is assigned the output of A using fresh random coins. For an integer m, we define [m] = {1, . . . , m}.
Proof of Theorem 2.1
In Section 5.1, we construct distributions {(X n , Z n , A n )} n∈N as claimed in Theorem 2.1 using 3n invocations of a commitment scheme as defined in Definition 5.1 below. Such a commitment scheme can be based on any injective one-way function as we'll discuss in Remark 5.2.
In Definition 5.3, we define "committing distributions," which can be seen as a relaxation of commitment schemes, where we drop efficient samplability and only require the hiding property to hold for infinitely many (not all sufficiently large) n ∈ N. In Section 5.2, we construct distributions as claimed in Theorem 2.1(b) using committing distributions, and in Section 5.3 we show that committing distributions exist if NP ⊆ P/poly. The standard construction 9 of commitment schemes from injective one-way functions satisfies this stronger notion (Goldreich 2000, Section 4.4.1.2) . Naor (1991) 
is committing if (i) For every polynomial p(.), the following holds for infinitely
many n ∈ N:
(ii) There exists an efficiently uniformly computable predicate φ such that for all n ∈ N and any (c,
A committing distribution (C, R, B) as in Definition 5.3 can be constructed from a commitment scheme as in Definition 5.1 by simply defining (C, R, B) = (com(B, R), R, B) and (φ(C, R, B) = 1) ⇐⇒ (com(B, R) = C).
5.1.
Counterexample from commitment scheme. We now define distributions {(X n , Z n , A n )} n∈N for which we'll prove they satisfy the conditions claimed in Theorem 2.1. For any n ∈ N, the last element A n of the tuple (X n , Z n , A n ) is a uniformly random bit. For i = 1, . . . , 3n define cc 25 (2016) A counterexample to the chain rule 581
Let R 1 , . . . , R 3n be uniform over {0, 1} n and
The remaining two elements X n and Z n are now defined as
where sort outputs the given input sequence in lexicographic order. Finally, we define a distribution (X n , Z n ) (to be used only in the proof) where Z n is as above, andX n is sampled by choosing an n element subset {i 1 , . . . , i n } of {1, . . . , 2n} at random and setting
By the following lemma, these distributions satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2.1.
Lemma 5.6. If com used to define {(X n , Z n , A n )} n∈N above is a commitment scheme as in Definition 5.1, then this ensemble is efficiently samplable and the following two conditions hold:
(2) There exists a polynomial time Turing machine M such that
Proof. Efficient samplability of (X n , Z n , A n ) follows since com can be efficiently computed. We'll omit the subscript n for the rest of the proof.
Condition (2) • x contains openings to n commitments from z to the bit 1 − a, i.e., for every i ∈ [n] it holds that c i is contained in z and c i = com(1 − a, r i ).
As com(., .) is injective and z contains exactly n commitments to 1 − a, there's only one sequence, namely x = x, that satisfies the above conditions. To prove condition (1) we'll need the following
Proof (of Claim). Consider hybrid distributions
where
So, Z j is derived from Z j−1 by replacing the commitment C j (to the bit A) with a new commitmentC j (to the opposite bit 1 − A). To prove the claim we show that
To see (X, Z n ) ∼ (X, Z 0 ), we first observe it holds for the marginal distribution Z n ∼ Z 0 : Both consist of 3n random commitments in lexicographic order, of which exactly 2n open to the same random bit. Moreover (X, Z n ) ∼ (X, Z 0 ) since X (resp.X) are openings of a random n element subset of the 2n commitments contained in Z n (resp. Z 0 ) that open to the same bit. A counterexample to the chain rule 583
By a standard hybrid argument, to show H 0 ∼ c H n (equivalently (X, Z 0 ) ∼ c (X, Z n )), it is sufficient to prove that H i−1 ∼ c H i for all 0 < i ≤ n, which we'll now do.
Assume for contradiction that for some i there exists an efficient distinguisher D for H i−1 and H i with non-negligible advantage δ = δ(n), i.e.,
Pr D(H
Below, we show how to construct an adversary D from D which given a commitment C = com(B, R) (for random B, R) predicts B with probability
thus breaking the hiding property of com. This contradicts the presumed security of com.
The adversary D (C) first samples (X, Z, A) and then derives
. . , C i in the same vain as Z i (cf. (5.8) and (5.9)) was derived from Z, except that we use the challenge C instead of C i for the ith slot. Note that depending on which bit B the commitment C commits to, the tuple (X, Z ) has either the distribution For (X, Z) as defined in (5.5), for all sufficiently large n (5.12)
To see this, we note thatX is uniform over a set of size 2n n and thus H ∞ (X|Z) = log 2n n .
11 By Definition 1.13, (5.12) together with Claim 5.7, which states that (X, Z) ∼ 1/p,p (X, Z) for any polynomial p = p(n) and all sufficiently large n, implies H HILL 1/p,p (X|Z) ≥ n, and thus proves condition (1) of Lemma 5.6.
11 There's a minor technicality we ignored so far in order to keep things simple:X is only uniform over a set of size 2n n if for i = 1, . . . , 2n the R i 's (and thus also the S i 's) are all distinct. We note that the randomly sampled R i 's will be all distinct with overwhelming probability, so this omission only adds an additive negligible error. We can avoid even this negligible error by 
Counterexample from committing distribution.
We now show how to construct an ensemble {(X n , Z n , A n )} n∈N as in Theorem 2.1(b) from an ensemble {(C n , R n , B n )} n∈N of committing distributions as in Definition 5.3. The construction is basically the same as in the previous section, except for how the S i are sampled, details follow. Let A n ← {0, 1} be random and define the B i as in (5.4). For each i = 1, . . . , 3n, let S i be a sample of (C n , R n , B n ), sampled conditioned on B n = B i .
(2) There exists a polynomial time Turing machine
The proof of Lemma 5.13 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.6, with two differences. First, the distributions (X n , Z n , A n ) are no longer efficiently samplable, as unlike in Lemma 5.6, the distributions (C n , R n , B n ) used to define it are not efficiently samplable. Second, Claim 5.7 must be relaxed to (X n , Z n ) ∼ 1/p(n),p(n) (X n , Z n ) for any polynomial p(.) and infinitely many n ∈ N (as opposed to all sufficiency large n). Consequently, also condition (1) in Lemma 5.13 only holds for infinitely many (not all sufficiently large) n ∈ N. The reason this relaxation is necessary is due to the fact that the hiding property for commitment schemes as in Definition 5.1 holds for all sufficiently large n, whereas in Definition 5.3 the analogous condition (i) for committing distributions is only required to hold for infinitely many n.
Footnote 11 continued initially sampling a random permutation π over {1, . . . , 3n}, and then replacing the C i with a tuple (C i , π(i)) throughout. This way, we enforce the
) to be all distinct, while the extra π(i) does not reveal any information about i, which is necessary for the proof. cc 25 (2016) A counterexample to the chain rule 585 5.3. Committing distribution from NP ⊆ P/poly. In this section, we show that committing distributions exist under the assumption that NP ⊆ P/poly. Unique-SAT (uSAT) is a promise problem, which asks for distinguishing unsatisfiable Boolean formulas from those with exactly one satisfying assignment. We first state an assumption (Assumption 5.14) on the hardness of uSAT, and in Lemma 5.15 construct a committing distribution under this assumption. We then show in Lemma 5.16 that the assumption holds if NP ⊆ P/poly. Assumption 5.14 (Nonuniform hardness of uSAT).
* denote the sets of Boolean formulas that have exactly one and zero satisfying assignments, respectively. Then, there exist ensembles
n of distributions over true and false instances, such that for any polynomial p(.) and any family of circuits {A n } n∈N where A n is of size p(n), for infinitely many n we have Proof. Condition (i) in Definition 5.3 directly follows from Assumption 5.14, as any circuit predicting B n with non-negligible advantage can be used to distinguish T n from F n with non-negligible 586 Krenn, Pietrzak, Wadia & Wichs cc 25 (2016) advantage. 12 A predicate as required for condition (ii) in Definition 5.3 can be defined as φ((I 0 , I 1 ), R, B) = 1 iff R is a satisfying assignment for I B . Note that I B has a unique satisfying assignment, namely R, whereas I 1−B has no such assignment. Thus, φ ((I 0 , I 1 ) , R , B ) = 1 iff (R, B) = (R , B ) as required by Definition 5.3.
Lemma 5.16. Assumption 5.14 holds if NP ⊆ P/poly.
In the proof of Lemma 5.16, we will use Impagliazzo's hardcore lemma (Impagliazzo 1995 p − c 12 Assume A n (C n ) predicts B n with non-negligible advantage. Equivalently, for any polynomial p(n), for infinitely many n and I F ← F n , I T ← T n , A n distinguishes (I F , I T ) from (I T , I F ) with advantage > 1/p(n). Then, using the triangle inequality, A n distinguishes either (I F , I F ) from (I F , I T ), or (I F , I T ) from (I T , I T ) with advantage > 1/2p(n). Assume the latter is the case, then A defined as A (I) = A(I, I T ) distinguishes I F from I T . A is not efficient, as I T is not necessarily efficiently samplable, but we can simply fix some optimal value for the second argument I T .
13 The main goal of Holenstein's lemma (compared to the original lemma due to Impagliazzo) was to get a tight lower bound on the size of the set S. For us, the size of S will be irrelevant, and so we don't even mention it in the statement of the Lemma. Holenstein (2005, Lemma 2.1) assumes |R n | ≥ 2 n−1 , whereas we need a smaller |R n | ≥ 2 n/2 . By inspection of his proof, assuming a smaller R n (as we do) doesn't make much of a difference, except that we get a smaller (but still exponential) upper bound on p (any superpolynomial upper bound would be enough for us). cc 25 (2016) A counterexample to the chain rule 587
Proof (of Lemma 5.16). It was shown by Valiant & Vazirani (1986) that unique-SAT is hard (i.e., not in BPP) if NP = RP (see also (Goldreich 2008, Section 6.2. 3) for a different, more general exposition). They consider a uniform model of computation. We work in a non-uniform model, and thus need unique-SAT to be hard against circuits. A randomized reduction implies a nonuniform one (by using nondeterminism to fix some good coins), thus their reduction also shows that unique-SAT is hard in a nonuniform setting if NP ⊆ P/poly. Let Π * Y ES and Π * NO denote any encodings of Boolean formulas with exactly one and zero satisfying assignments, respectively. We define redundant encodings Π Y ES and Π NO , where the last 5/6th of the bits can be ignored:
Π NO is defined analogously using Π * NO . Looking forward, considering such padded instances will allow us to boost the error probability of any family of poly-size circuits in deciding unique-SAT for the infinitely many n on which it errs on instances of length n from 2 −n as in (5.19) to 2 −n/6 (where n = 6n ) on instances of length n as in (5.20), and this larger error (in terms of instance length) is required to apply Lemma 5.17. Let
n and define the predicates
As by assumption unique-SAT is not in P/poly, for any polynomial p * (.) and any circuit family {A * n } n∈N of size |A * n | ≤ p * (n), for infinitely many n the circuit A * n must err on at least one instance of R * n . In particular, for the family {A * n } n∈N with the best advantage in predicting f * (n) 2016) holds for infinitely many n . If we define the polynomial p(6n) = p * (n), then (5.19) implies that for the ensemble {A n } n∈N of size |A n | ≤ p(n) with the best advantage in predicting f (x), for infinitely many n (namely, all n = 6n where (5.19) holds for n ) we have with δ(n) = 2
To see this, we first observe that we can assume that A n ignores the last 5/6n bits of the input. 14 Thus, if A n (x r) errs on some input x r, it will err on 2 5n/6 inputs, namely on x r for all r ∈ {0, 1} 5n/6 . Note that 2 n/2 δ(n) 2 /32 = 2 n/6 /8 is exponential, and thus it upper bounds the polynomial p(n) for all sufficiently large n. For any such sufficiently large n for which (5.20) holds, we can apply Lemma 5.17 to conclude there exists a set S n ⊆ R n for which
Using (5.21), we will construct distributions T n and F n over yes and no instances such that for all all circuits A n as above
As we can choose 1/3γ(n) to be an arbitrary large polynomial by choosing p * (n) large enough, this proves Lemma 5.16 (with the arbitrary polynomial p(n) in Assumption 5.14 being 1/3γ(n)).
16
14 As, using (5.18), for any circuit A n there exists an r such that the circuit A n (x r) = A n (x r ) (where A n ignores r) errs with at most the same probability as A n (x r). 15 We note that the size requirement |R n | ≥ 2 n/2 of Lemma 5.17 is satisfied as the definition (5.18) of our padding implies
n/6 |. 16 Technically, here we have assumed that Assumption 5.14 holds for Π Y ES and Π NO instances as in (5.18), where the last 5/6th of the bits are just random paddings. We observe that the assumption for such "padded" instances trivially implies the assumption for any encoding of instances. cc 25 (2016) A counterexample to the chain rule 589 It remains to show that (5.21) implies (5.22). For this, let T n = S n ∩ Π Y ES and F n = S n ∩ Π NO . We note that S n must contain roughly the same number of yes and no instances:
To see this, assume for contradiction that this does not hold, i.e.,
. In the first case, the constant function A n (x) = 1 contradicts (5.21), in the second case we get a contradiction using A n (x) = 0.
With this observation, we can define a distribution S which has statistical distance at most γ(n) to the uniform distribution over S n = T n ∪ F n , where the support of S lies in S n and which is perfectly balanced in the sense that
, this definition is used in the third equality below. In the fourth equality, we use (5.23). The fifth equality uses the fact that S is γ(n) close to the uniform distribution over S n and the last inequality follows by (5.21).
Note that the above proves (5.22).
17 Concretely, we let S be the uniform distribution over S n conditioned on an event that holds with probability at least 1−γ. Assume that Pr x←Sn [x ∈ T n ] = 1/2+γ/2 for some γ > 0, then this event is defined as follows: The event always holds if x ∈ F n , and fails with probability δ = 1−(1/2−γ/2)/(1/2+γ/2) if x ∈ T (this δ satisfies (1/2−γ/2) = (1/2+γ/2)(1−δ) as required to satisfy (5.23)). The probability that the event fails is
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Counterexample from lossy functions
In this section, we give a particularly simple counterexample to the chain rule for conditional HILL entropy, which is based on lossy functions. We stress that we only need lossy functions not lossy trapdoor functions. Below we define -lossy functions (Peikert & Waters 2008) , where for simplicity we only define the particular setting where the key-space, input and output domain are all bitstrings of length n (but everything goes through unchanged for the general definition, where these domains can be described by strings of length polynomial in n).
Definition 6.1 (Lossy Function). An = (n) lossy function consists of two efficient algorithms
The probabilistic key-generation KG takes as input a security parameter 1 n in unary and mode ∈ {lossy, injective} and outputs a key
n → {0, 1} n such that for every
and every x ∈ {0, 1} n we have
• |F A counterexample to the chain rule 591
Proof. We will omit the subscripts n in this proof. First, sample an injective and lossy key
Then sample inputs X 0 , X 1 ← {0, 1} n and compute
Next, choose a random bit A ← {0, 1} and define
. Looking forward, the tuple (X 0 , Z, A) will correspond to (X n , Z n , A n ) in the statement of the theorem. It is instructive to observe that the min-entropy of X 0 and X 1 conditioned on Z is
The left equation holds as X 0 can be computed (in exponential time) given Z. Concretely, we can perfectly distinguish lossy from injective keys, and thus determine A which tells us which tuple in
is uniform over a the set F −1
which is of size 2 since K 1 is lossy.
As we'll show below, for HILL entropy the picture is different, because given Z the value of A is computationally hidden and thus we don't know which of the two keys is the lossy one.
We first show that H 
In particular, for = log(2/ε) we get
Proof. Let C, s and ε be as in the hypothesis of the claim and let p eq (m) be the size of the circuit that takes as input two m-bit strings and outputs 1 if they are equal. Define the distinguisher
18 Given a pair of keys K, K , one of which is lossy, we can sample random
cc 25 (2016) A counterexample to the chain rule 593 Therefore we have
We just proved that (Y, Z)
(X|Z) ≤ as required.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Let
where A n ∈ {0, 1}, be an efficiently samplable ensemble where for every polynomial p(n) and for all sufficiently large n it holds that
To prove Proposition 2.4, we must use this to construct a OWF.
Recall that the lhs of (7.2) is condition (i) from Theorem 2.1 and the rhs is implied by condition (ii) from Theorem 2.1 (as explained in the statement of Proposition 2.4).
Proof (of Proposition 2.4). Let f (·) denote the efficient sampling algorithm, which on input randomness R n outputs a sample (X n , Z n , A n ). Let f (·) denote f (·), but where we drop the X n part from the output: i.e., f (R n ) = (Z n , A n ). We claim that f is a one-way function.
To show this, we assume for contradiction there exists a (nonuniform) polynomial-size inversion algorithm D = {D n } n∈N that breaks one-wayness. In more detail, there is some polynomial q(n) such that, for infinitely many n ∈ N, (7.3)
Pr (x,z,a)←(Xn,Zn,An) [f (D n (z, a)) = (z, a)] ≥ 1/q(n).
As H ∞ (X n |Z n , A n ) = 0, x is completely determined by (z, a), which implies that (7.3) is equivalent to (7.4) Pr (x,z,a)←(Xn,Zn,An) [f (D n (z, a)) = (x, z, a)] ≥ 1/q(n).
Let f (·) be the same as f (·), but where we only output the X n part: i.e., f (R n ) = X n . Then (note that in the last inequality Define the polynomial-size circuit family C = {C n } n∈N via C n (z) = f (D n (z, b) ) where the bit b ← {0, 1} is sampled uniformly at random. Now (7.5) can be stated as Pr (x,z)←(Xn,Zn) [C n (z) = x] ≥ 1/(2q(n)).
Then, by applying Claim 7.1 with ε = 1/(2q(n)) and = log(4q(n)) there is some polynomial p(n) = |C n | + p eq (|X n |) such that, for infinitely many n: H HILL 1/(4q(n)),p(n) (X n |Z n ) ≤ log(4q(n)) = O(log n).
This contradicts (7.2). Therefore, the function f must be one-way, which proves the proposition.
7.3. Proof of Proposition 2.6. Let {(X n , Z n , A n )} n∈N be an ensemble of distributions as in Theorem 2.1(b). That is, for every polynomial p(n) and for infinitely many n it holds that (7.6) H HILL 1/p(n),p(n) (X n |Z n ) ≥ n and moreover there exist a polynomial time Turing machine M such that for any n ∈ N and any (x, z, a) ∈ supp[(X n , Z n , A n )] (7.7) (M(x , z, a) = 1) ⇐⇒ (x = x).
cc 25 (2016) By the hypothesis of the lemma, for every c ∈ supp[C], the circuit D(., c) outputs 1 on exactly one possible value, which we'll denote by v c . Now which contradicts the right side of (7.12).
Conclusion
Computational entropy, most notably pseudorandomness, is a extremely useful concept in cryptography. The general idea is to exploit the fact that to computationally bounded parties, random variables can look and behave as if they had much more entropy than they actually do. In this paper, we showed that one of the most fundamental properties of entropy notions, the chain rule, does not hold for HILL entropy, arguably the most important computational entropy notion.
cc 25 (2016) A counterexample to the chain rule 599
We gave counterexamples to the chain rule from a variety of cryptographic primitives: injective one-way functions, lossy functions and (in the conference version of this paper) also from deniable encryption. As discussed in Section 2.4, the latter two are very efficient counterexamples, using just one or two invocations of the underlying primitive. This shows that schemes achieving sophisticated cryptographic properties like deniability or lossiness inherently embed strong counterexamples to the chain rule, and we believe it might be fruitful to investigate some cryptographic objects from this perspective.
